The Battle of the Alamo
March 6th, 2011 . by TexasFredTexasFred Notes: The Alamo was defended by approximately 180 Texas patriots. On this day in 1836 The Alamo fell after Santa Ana laid siege with 3,500 Mexican troops, supported by many cannons.
Today Mexicans celebrate what they perceive to be a victory. Texans look at The Alamo and see a somewhat different perspective.
The defenders of The Alamo were outnumbered some 20 to 1 and the Mexicans did take The Alamo, losing over 1,800 men in the process, and it still took the Mexicans THIRTEEN DAYS to take The Alamo!
The Battle of the Alamo
The myth and legend of the Alamo is the creation story of Texas, central to the Texas legend itself, and it is a legend which continues growing, capturing the imagination of people around the world.
The entire siege lasted 13 days. Tuesday February 23 – Sunday March 6, 1836. The siege and final battle of the Alamo in 1836 constitute the most celebrated military engagement in Texas history. The battle was conspicuous for the large number of illustrious personalities among its combatants. These included Tennessee congressman David Crockett, entrepreneur-adventurer James Bowie, and Mexican president Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna. Although not nationally famous at the time, William Barret Travis achieved lasting distinction as commander at the Alamo. For many Americans and most Texans, the battle has become a symbol of patriotic sacrifice. Traditional popular depictions, including novels, stage plays, and motion pictures, emphasize legendary aspects that often obscure the historical event.
To understand the real battle, one must appreciate its strategic context in the Texas Revolution. In December 1835 a Federalist army of Texan (or Texian, as they were called) immigrants, American volunteers, and their Tejano allies had captured the town from a Centralist force during the siege of Bexar. With that victory, a majority of the Texan volunteers of the “Army of the People�? left service and returned to their families. Nevertheless, many officials of the provisional government feared the Centralists would mount a spring offensive. Two main roads led into Texas from the Mexican interior. The first was the Atascosito Road, which stretched from Matamoros on the Rio Grande northward through San Patricio, Goliad, Victoria, and finally into the heart of Austin’s colony. The second was the Old San Antonio Road, a camino real that crossed the Rio Grande at Paso de Francia (the San Antonio Crossing) and wound northeastward through San Antonio de Béxar, Bastrop, Nacogdoches, San Augustine, and across the Sabine River into Louisiana. Two forts blocked these approaches into Texas: Presidio La BahÃa (Nuestra Señora de Loreto Presidio) at Goliad and the Alamo at San Antonio. Each installation functioned as a frontier picket guard, ready to alert the Texas settlements of an enemy advance. James Clinton Neill received command of the Bexar garrison. Some ninety miles to the southeast, James Walker Fannin, Jr., subsequently took command at Goliad. Most Texan settlers had returned to the comforts of home and hearth. Consequently, newly arrived American volunteers-some of whom counted their time in Texas by the week-constituted a majority of the troops at Goliad and Bexar. Both Neill and Fannin determined to stall the Centralists on the frontier. Still, they labored under no delusions. Without speedy reinforcements, neither the Alamo nor Presidio La BahÃa could long withstand a siege.
Bexar had twenty-one artillery pieces of various caliber. Because of his artillery experience and his regular army commission, Neill was a logical choice to command. Throughout January he did his best to fortify the mission fort on the outskirts of town. Maj. Green B. Jameson, chief engineer at the Alamo, installed most of the cannons on the walls. Jameson boasted to Gen. Sam Houston that if the Centralists stormed the Alamo, the defenders could “whip 10 to 1 with our artillery.�? Such predictions proved excessively optimistic. Far from the bulk of Texas settlements, the Bexar garrison suffered from a lack of even basic provender. On January 14 Neill wrote Houston that his people were in a “torpid, defenseless condition.�? That day he dispatched a grim message to the provisional government: “Unless we are reinforced and victualled, we must become an easy prey to the enemy, in case of an attack.�?
By January 17, Houston had begun to question the wisdom of maintaining Neill’s garrison at Bexar. On that date he informed Governor Henry Smith that Col. James Bowie and a company of volunteers had left for San Antonio. Many have cited this letter as proof that Houston ordered the Alamo abandoned. Yet, Houston’s words reveal the truth of the matter:
“I have ordered the fortifications in the town of Bexar to be demolished, and, if you should think well of it, I will remove all the cannon and other munitions of war to Gonzales and Copano, blow up the Alamo and abandon the place, as it will be impossible to keep up the Station with volunteers, the sooner I can be authorized the better it will be for the country.�?
Houston may have wanted to raze the Alamo, but he was clearly requesting Smith’s consent. Smith did not “think well of it�? and refused to authorize Houston’ s proposal.
On January 19, Bowie rode into the Alamo compound, and what he saw impressed him. As a result of much hard work, the mission had begun to look like a fort. Neill, who understood the consequences of leaving the camino real unguarded, convinced Bowie that the Alamo was the only post between the enemy and Anglo settlements. Neill’s arguments and his leadership electrified Bowie. “I cannot eulogize the conduct and character of Col. Neill too highly,�? he wrote Smith; “no other man in the army could have kept men at this post, under the neglect they have experienced.�? On February 2 Bowie wrote Smith that he and Neill had resolved to “die in these ditches�? before they would surrender the post. The letter confirmed Smith’s understanding of controlling factors. He had concluded that Bexar must not go undefended. Rejecting Houston’s advice, Smith prepared to funnel additional troops and provisions to San Antonio. In brief, Houston had asked for permission to abandon the post. Smith considered his request. He answered, “No.�?
Colonel Neill had complained that “for want of horses,�? he could not even “send out a small spy company.�? If the Alamo were to function as an early-warning station, Neill had to have outriders. Now fully committed to bolstering the Bexar garrison, Smith directed Lt. Col. William B. Travis to take his “Legion of Cavalry�? and report to Neill. Only thirty horsemen responded to the summons. Travis pleaded with Governor Smith to reconsider: “I am unwilling to risk my reputation (which is ever dear to a soldier) by going off into the enemy’ s country with such little means, and with them so badly equipped.�? Travis threatened to resign his commission, but Smith ignored these histrionics. At length, Travis obeyed orders and dutifully made his way toward Bexar with his thirty troopers. Reinforcements began to trickle into Bexar. On February 3, Travis and his cavalry contingent reached the Alamo. The twenty six year old cavalry officer traveled to his new duty station under duress. Yet, like Bowie, he soon became committed to Neill and the fort, which he began to describe as the “key to Texas.�? About February 8, David Crockett arrived with a group of American volunteers.